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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a small open economy model to study sovereign default and debt
renegotiation within a dynamic borrowing framework. The model features both endogenous
default risk and endogenous debt recovery rates. A country’s future borrowing and default
decisions aﬀect the determination of debt recovery rates in a Nash bargaining game; whereas
the endogenous debt recovery rates, in turn, inﬂuence the country’s ex ante incentive to default.
Sovereign bonds are priced to compensate creditors for the risks of default and debt restructuring
in equilibrium. We ﬁnd that both equilibrium debt recovery rates and sovereign bond prices
decrease with the level of debt. In a quantitative analysis, the model successfully accounts
for the volatile and countercyclical bond spreads, countercyclical current account and other
empirical regularities of the Argentine economy. The model also replicates the dynamics of
bond spreads during the recent debt crisis in Argentina. Furthermore, we show that introducing
an endogenous debt recovery schedule leads to a higher default probability and greater interest
rate volatility.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The markets of sovereign debt for emerging economies have developed rapidly over the past few
decades.1 Associated with the enormous growth of sovereign debt markets are the recurrent
large-scale sovereign debt crises.2 To resolve the debt crises in the absence of an international
bankruptcy law, the defaulting countries and lenders usually renegotiate over the reduction of
defaulted debt.3 Despite the importance of post-default debt renegotiation to sovereign borrow-
ing and default, the existing literature does not contain a model that adequately captures the
strategic considerations at play in the international capital markets. It remains a challenge to
incorporate both sovereign default risk and debt renegotiation into a dynamic equilibrium model
and to account for the dynamics of sovereign bond spreads in emerging economies.
In this paper, we develop a small open economy model to investigate the connection between
sovereign default, debt renegotiation, and interest rates in a dynamic borrowing framework.
The model features both endogenous default risk and endogenous debt recovery rates. With
this model, we theoretically and quantitatively study the determination of debt recovery rates
and how debt renegotiation interacts with a country’s default decision. Moreover, we analyze
the valuation of sovereign bonds and map the model to the Argentine data in a quantitative
exercise.
In the model, a risk-averse country and risk-neutral competitive ﬁnancial intermediaries trade
one-period discount bonds in incomplete capital markets. The country faces stochastic endow-
ments and has an option to default. Default may result in the loss of future access to the capital
markets, or incur direct sanctions imposed by the lenders. However, through renegotiation over
debt reduction, the ineﬃcient sanctions can be lifted and the defaulting country can restore its
reputation, regaining access to capital markets once the renegotiated debt is repaid in full. In
the meantime, the lenders can recover at least a part of the defaulted bonds. Debt recovery
rates, which are endogenously determined in a Nash bargaining game, aﬀect a country’s ex ante
incentive to default. In equilibrium, sovereign bonds are priced to compensate the lenders for
both the default risk and the risk of debt restructuring.
We ﬁrst establish the existence of a recursive equilibrium in the model economy. In equilib-
rium bond prices and debt recovery rates are jointly determined, and vary with the domestic
endowment and the level of debt. We analytically characterize the equilibrium bond prices and
equilibrium debt recovery schedule. The debt recovery rates decrease with the indebtedness,
1The total amount of debt outstanding in developing countries has increased from $553 billion to $2,433 billion
from 1980 to 2003. In 2003 the total international debt issued by emerging economies reached $167.2 billion.
2There are 84 events of sovereign default from 1975 to 2002 according to Standard and Poor’s (2002). One
recent example is the Argentina’s default on the international bonds of over $82 billion in 2001.
3The most recent renegotiation is the Argentine sovereign debt restructuring closed in 2005. See Chuhan and
Sturzenegger (2003) for the cases of sovereign debt renegotiation in 1980 to 2000.
2but for low debt levels, there is no debt reduction. We also show that default may arise in
equilibrium, and a country is more likely to default if it has a higher level of debt. Finally,
interest rates increase with the level of debt due to the higher default probability and lower debt
recovery rate.
We use the model to analyze quantitatively the sovereign debt of Argentina, calibrating the
model to match the default probability, debt recovery rate, and debt-to-output ratio. The model
successfully accounts for the volatility of the short-term Argentine bond spreads. Moreover, it
generates the countercyclicality of bond spreads, which is found to have an important eﬀect on
the business cycles of emerging economies.4 In the model, when a country gets a bad shock,
default risk is higher, and expected debt recovery rate is smaller. Therefore, the sovereign bond
spreads are higher in recessions. Furthermore, the model generates volatile consumption and
countercyclical current account, which are in line with the data. We also show that the model
can replicate the time series of Argentine bond spreads from 1992 to 2002.
In addition, we quantitatively examine the role of debt renegotiation. Compared to the
models with endogenous default but no renegotiation,5 our model can generate higher default
probabilities and more volatile bond spreads. The introduction of debt renegotiation induces
more frequent defaults because the international ﬁnancial intermediaries are willing to lend
more and the default option is more appealing to the borrowing country. At the same time,
the endogenous debt recovery rates contribute to the higher bond price volatility because the
movement in the debt recovery rates ampliﬁes default risk. We also demonstrate that the changes
in bargaining power have a great impact on debt recovery rates as well as on the sovereign bond
spreads, shedding light on the policy implications of sovereign debt restructuring procedure.
When the sovereign borrower has a higher bargaining power, the equilibrium debt recovery rates
decrease, which drives up the sovereign bond spreads. However, the average sovereign bond
spreads may not increase because the country couldb o r r o wl e s si ne q u i l i b r i u ma n di sl e s sl i k e l y
to default. As a result, the sovereign bond spreads do not increase monotonically with the
bargaining power.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next subsection discusses the related
literature. In Section 2, we describe the model environment. Section 3 presents the sovereign
borrower and lenders’ problems and deﬁnes a recursive equilibrium. We then demonstrate the
existence of a recursive equilibrium and characterize the equilibrium bond prices and debt re-
covery rates. Section 4 presents the model calibration and results of the quantitative analysis.
We conduct sensitivity analysis and policy experiments in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 oﬀers
4Neumeyer and Perri (2004) and Uribe and Yue (2005) document the countercyclical country interest rates for
emerging markets. They show that countercyclicality of sovereign bond spreads exacerbates the business cycle
ﬂuctuations in these countries.
5Arellano (2004) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b) assume these default penalties in their quantitative study
of sovereign default.
3concluding remarks. The proofs and computational procedure are in the Appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
Our work builds on several strands of literature. A signiﬁcant part of the sovereign debt lit-
erature focuses on the question of why countries repay their debt. Reputation and sanctions
have been identiﬁed as two main enforcement mechanisms of debt repayment. In their pioneering
work on reputation models, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) argue that a country’s incentive to make
repayments is to preserve its reputation as a good borrower. In their model, the country uses
international capital markets to share its income risk, but default causes a permanent exclusion
from the markets. Grossman and Van Huyck (1987), Atkeson (1991), Cole and Kehoe (1998),
Kletzer and Wright (2000), and Wright (2002), explore other aspects of reputation mechanism
in enforcing debt repayment in models with dynamic borrowing. In the second approach, the
country’s debt repayment motive comes from the creditors’ threat of direct sanctions. In par-
ticular, Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989a) argue that direct default punishment is necessary to support
international debt when cash-in-advance contract is available. Sachs and Cohen (1982) and Cole
and Kehoe (2000) also assume direct default cost in analyzing the sovereign debt crises. How-
ever, all these papers assume that a country either fully repays its debt or defaults completely,
incurring the default penalties. The manner in wh i c had e b tc r i s i si sr e s o l v e di sn o tt a k e ni n t o
account and thus plays no role in the country’s default decision in these papers.
The literature on sovereign debt renegotiation analyzes the impact of debt renegotiation on
international lending and borrowing. Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989b) present a model of sovereign debt
renegotiation in which direct sanctions are lifted through a continuous bargaining. Fernandez
and Rosenthal (1990) analyze debt renegotiation by assuming that the borrowing country gains
improved future access to capital markets when the renegotiated debt is repaid in full. Recent
studies (see Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody (2003), Weinschelbaum and Wynne (2003) and
Bolton and Jeanne (2004)) focus on the implication of several proposals about the reforms of
sovereign debt renegotiation process, including Collective Action Clauses (CACs) and Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism.6 However, the dynamic bargaining games analyzed in this
literature are embedded in a static one-shot borrowing model. Therefore, a country’s reputation
for future borrowing plays no role in the renegotiation. The distinguishing feature of our paper
relative to the two strands of literature above is that we incorporate both default and debt
renegotiation into a dynamic borrowing model. Thus the defaulting country’s reputation is
important in the bargaining and the valuation of sovereign bonds depends on both default risk
and debt recovery rates. Moreover, the framework in our paper helps to evaluate the policy
6Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts are majority renegotiation clauses, under which
the changes endorsed by a speciﬁed majority of bond holders are binding on all bondholders. Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism is a statutory code proposed by IMF. See Roubini and Setser (2004) for more details.
4reform of debt renegotiation process.
There are relatively few papers that study sovereign debt pricing. Gibson and Sundaresan
(2001) present a model of sovereign debt valuation with endogenous default risk and restructuring
risk in a static borrowing framework. Arellano (2004), and Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b) explore
the connection between endogenous default, interest rates and income ﬂuctuations in a dynamic
model. Their models can generate countercyclical bond spreads. However, their models are less
successful in explaining the high default frequency and large interest rate volatility in Argentina.
Moreover, they rule out debt renegotiation by assuming a zero debt recovery rate post default.
Our equilibrium model not only endogenizes debt recovery rates, but also quantitatively accounts
for the volatile and countercyclical sovereign bond spreads as well as the high default frequency.
This paper is also related to the literature of optimal contract with endogenous risk of
default, such as Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota(1996), and Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
In this literature, perfect risk sharing is not achieved due to the commitment problem even
though the asset markets are complete. Default does not arise in equilibrium, and agents with
high endowment have higher default incentive, which is counterfactual. Several papers in this
literature, such as Phelan (1995), Krueger and Uhlig (2004) and Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini
(2004), endogenize an agent’s outside options. They assume that the defaulted agents can start
a new credit relationship with a competing ﬁnancial intermediary. This paper is related to these
works in endogenizing the value of default. The diﬀerence is that our model does generate default
in equilibrium, and the default risk is higher at bad times.
Several papers on consumer default are also relevant. Athreya (2002) develops a dynamic
equilibrium model of personal bankruptcy with stochastic punishment spells to investigate the
welfare implication of the bankruptcy reform. Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull
(2002) construct an equilibrium model of unsecured consumer debt and default to evaluate
bankruptcy law. The theoretical framework in their paper explains the endogenous borrowing
limit, and our model is closely related to theirs. Li and Sarte (2003) and Athreya (2004) assess
the role of production and asset exemption in consumer bankruptcy, respectively. Livshits,
MacGee and Tertilt (2003) compare the consumer bankruptcy rules in the U.S. and Germany.
In contrast to the case of consumer default studied in these papers, bankruptcy rules are absent
in sovereign default. Therefore, the post-default debt renegotiation plays an important role in
resolving sovereign debt crises, which is the focus of our paper.
2 The Model Environment
We study sovereign default and debt renegotiation in a dynamic model of a small open economy.
We consider a risk-averse sovereign country that can not aﬀect the world interest rate. The





where 0 <β<1 is the discount factor of the sovereign, ct denotes the consumption in period
t and u : R+ → R is the period utility function, which is assumed to be continuous, strictly
increasing, strictly concave, and satisﬁes the Inada conditions. The discount factor reﬂects both
the sovereign’s pure time preference and the probability that the current sovereignty will sustain
in the next period.7
The model analyzes an endowment economy. In each period the country receives an ex-
ogenous endowment of the single non-storable consumption good yt ∈ Y . The endowment yt
is stochastic, reﬂecting the variation in a country’s output due to changes in trade environ-
ment, production technology, or other factors. We assume that yt has a compact support Y
and is drawn from a atomless probability space where µy (yt|yt−1) is the probability distribution
function of a shock yt conditional on the previous realization yt−1.
International ﬁnancial intermediaries are risk-neutral and have perfect information on the
country’s endowment and asset position. We also assume that they behave competitively on the
international capital markets and can borrow or lend as much as needed at a constant world
risk-free interest rate r. Each period, one ﬁnancial intermediary is randomly selected to trade
with the sovereign government.8
The capital markets are incomplete. The sovereign government and ﬁnancial intermediaries
can borrow or lend via one-period zero-coupon bonds, but no state-contingent contracts are
available. The face value of a discount bond is denoted as b0, specifying the amount to be repaid
next period. When the sovereign government purchases bonds, b0 > 0, and when it issues new
bonds, b0 < 0. The set of bond face values is B =[ bmin,b max] ⊂ R,w h e r ebmin ≤ 0 ≤ bmax.
We set the lower bound bmin < −
y
r, which is the largest debt level that could be repaid by the
country. The upper bound bmax is the highest level of assets that the country may accumulate.
Such an upper bound exists when the interest rates on a country’s saving are suﬃciently small
compared to the time discount factor. Speciﬁcally, let q(b0,y) be the price of a bond with face
value b0 issued by the sovereign with an endowment shock y. We assume that for b>0,b o n d
price q(b,y) >β . The bond price function will be determined in equilibrium.
7Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) construct a model of sovereign borrowing where the time discount factor is
a product of time preference coeﬃcient and the government’s survival probability of staying in power next period.
8An alternative assumption is that there exists a coordinating mechanism for creditors in the debt renegotiation.
That is, we rule out the strategic "holdouts" behavior of creditors in the post-default debt renegotiation. Our
assumption corresponds to the sovereign bonds issued with CAC clauses, or the sovereign loans restructured
through the London Club or the Paris Club.
62.1 Default Option and Renegotiation on Debt Reduction
As in most sovereign debt studies, we assume that sovereign debt contracts have one-sided
commitment.9 The ﬁnancial intermediaries always keep their promise. But the sovereign gov-
ernment is free to decide whether to repay or default on its debt. Default can result in two
types of punishment. The ﬁrst type of punishment is the reputation cost of losing its access to
the capital markets, as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). The defaulting country cannot borrow
because the debt contract signed ﬁrst has to be honored ﬁrst before new debt can be issued.10
We also assume that the country cannot save after default. This assumption can be rationalized
if the assets that the country attempts to accumulate in the default periods will be seized by
the creditors. Alternatively, the ﬁnancial intermediaries can collude and apply the "cheat the
cheater" strategy (see Kletzer and Wright (2000) and Wright (2002)). In either case, countries
with default on record are unable to save, and the saving opportunity analyzed in Bulow and
Rogoﬀ (1989a) does not apply. We also assume that there is a loss equal to a fraction λd of
endowment for a country with a default record, which captures the direct cost associated with
a bad reputation.11
The second type of punishment is the direct sanctions that creditors may impose on the
defaulting country. Creditors may litigate on foreign courts or apply trade sanctions, forcing
the country to conduct its trade in roundabout ways to avoid seizure, as discussed in Bulow
and Rogoﬀ (1989b) and Rose (2002). Due to these retaliatory actions, the country’s endowment
decreases by a fraction λs.
However, when debt renegotiation is allowed, sovereign default does not necessarily lead
to an imposition of full default punishment and complete disruption of the debt relationships.
Direct sanctions, λsy, can be avoided if the creditors can be persuaded to waive sanctions in
debt renegotiations. The ﬁnancial exclusion can also be alleviated to a temporary exclusion from
the markets. Thus, both types of default penalty can be reduced through debt renegotiation.
Such a renegotiation is beneﬁcial to both parties: the sovereign country avoids severe default
punishment and the creditors get partial payments in debt renegotiation.
We assume that the lender bargains with the sovereign government over debt reduction. A
debt reduction renegotiation involves the following concessions:
1) Upon agreement, the government’s next-period debt arrear is reduced to some fraction of
the unpaid debt b.
2) The intermediaries do not impose the direct sanctions λsy on the country.
9Kletzer and Wright (2000) present a model of sovereign default with two-sided commitment problem.
10We can assume that the debt contract contains a "negative pledge" clause to ensure the seniority of debt
contracts.
11For example, the defaulting country may not obtain technology, direct investment, and other aids from the
foreign countries, which reduces its output. Cole and Kehoe (1998) analyze a model in which sovereign default
aﬀects a government’s reputation in other economic relationship.
7The debt recovery rate is given by the function α(b,y), which determines the fraction of
debt to be repaid if the sovereign defaults on debt b with endowment shock y. Should the
renegotiation fail, the international investors would lose their investment, and the country stays
in autarky forever from that period on.
We denote the country’s credit score by a discrete variable h ∈ {0,1}.L e th =0denote no
debt crises on a country’s record, that is, a good credit score; whereas h =1indicates a record
of sovereign default in the country’s credit history, or a bad credit score. A country’s credit
score deteriorates after a default event. We assume that the government with a bad credit score
after default cannot save or borrow. The defaulting country can regain its access to the capital
markets once the renegotiated debt is repaid in full. Therefore, with renegotiation, the country
can restore its reputation after default.12
2.2 Timeline
Figure 1 displays the timing of decisions within one period in the model economy. At the
beginning of the period, an endowment shock y is realized. The sovereign government has assets
b. When the government has a good credit score (h =0 ) , it decides to repay its debt or default.
If the government decides not to default, then it chooses b0 and its credit score remains good for
the next period (h0 =0 ) . If the government chooses to default, its debt is reduced to α(b,y)b
through debt renegotiation. But its credit score deteriorates (h0 =1 ) . When the government
starts with a bad credit score (h =1 )with unpaid debt arrear b, it determines how much debt
to repay. If some debt arrear is not repaid (b0 > 0), then the country’s credit score remains
bad (h0 =1 ) . Once all the debt arrear is repaid (b0 =0 ) , the government regains its reputation
(h0 =0 ) .
3 Recursive Equilibrium
In this section, we deﬁne and characterize a dynamic recursive equilibrium. In Subsection 3.1
we analyze the sovereign government’s problem when the bond price schedule and the debt
recovery plan are taken as given. In the subsequent two subsections, 3.2 and 3.3, we study the
renegotiation problem and the lenders’ problem to determine the debt recovery schedule and
bond price schedule respectively. Subsection 3.4 deﬁnes a dynamic recursive equilibrium, in
which both bond prices and debt recovery rates are endogenized. Finally, we demonstrate the
existence of the equilibrium and characterize the equilibrium in Subsection 3.5.
12Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) study a sovereign debt renegotiation game in which the defaulting country
beneﬁts from accessing capital markets when it fully repays the debt arrear. Cole, Dow and English (1995)
develop a signaling model of sovereign debt in which a defaulting country regain access to capital markets by
making partial debt repayment.
83.1 Sovereign Government’s Problem
The sovereign government’s objective is to maximize the expected lifetime utility of a domestic
representative agent. The government makes its default decision and decides the amount of
assets for next period, given the current asset position b and the endowment shock y.O n l y
the country with a good credit history can have debt. Hence the set L = B ×{ 0}×Y ∪
B−− ×{ 1}×Y lists all possible (b,h,y) triplets of state variables, where B−− = B ∩ R−− =
[bmin,0).L e t v(b,h,y):L → R be the life-time value function for the country that starts the
current period with the credit score h,a s s e tp o s i t i o nb, and endowment shock y.L e t V be
the set of all continuous functions v : L → R. We restrict the space of bond price functions
to be Q =
n





, and the space of debt recovery schedules to be
A = {α|α(b,y):B−− × Y → [0,1]}. Given any bond price function q ∈ Q and debt recovery
schedule α ∈ A, the sovereign government solves its optimization problem. The government’s
problem can be written in a recursive way as follows.
For b ≥ 0 and h =0 , the country has a good credit score and savings from last period.
There is no debt to default in this case. The government receives payments from the ﬁnancial
intermediaries and determines its next-period asset position b0 to maximize utility. The country’s





















For b<0 and h =0 , the country has a good credit score and outstanding debt. The
government determines to default or not optimally. If the government chooses to honor its
debt obligation, it is a standard consumption-saving problem as in the previous case. If the
government defaults, it can not borrow or save in the current period. Moreover, the country’s

















For h =1 , the country has a bad credit score and unpaid debt arrear b<0. The country
cannot save or borrow in the current period because of the bad reputation. In the current period,
the endowment suﬀers a proportional loss of λdy. We assume that the creditors can enforce the
interest payment.13 The government chooses to optimally pay back the debt arrear. If the
government repays partially, the debt level in the beginning of next period is the agent’s choice
13This assumption is reasonable because it is common to pledge a renegotiated debt contract with risk-free
bonds. For instance, according to the Brady plan, bonds which are issued to exchange for defaulted bank loans
are backed with U.S. Treasury zero coupon bonds. See Chuhan and Strurzenegger (2003).
9b0 and its credit score remains bad. The debt arrear rolls over at the interest rate r.W h e na l l
the debt arrear is paid up, the country regains its full access to the markets.



























In the model economy, the country may have an incentive to default because the default
option and debt renegotiation introduce contingencies into normally non-contingent sovereign
debt contracts, and thereby facilitate interstate consumption smoothing. But as we will show
in the subsequent analysis, default comes at the cost of a higher equilibrium interest rate and
more limited access to the ﬁnancial markets, both of which hurt the country’s intertemporal
consumption smoothing. The sovereign government’s default policy can be characterized by
default sets. Let D(b) ⊂ Y be the set of endowment shock y’s for which default is optimal given
the debt position b.T h a ti s
D(b)=
n
y ∈ Y : vr (b,0,y) ≤ vd (b,0,y)
o
where




















3.2 Debt Renegotiation Problem
If a country defaults, the sovereign government and ﬁnancial intermediaries can renegotiate
over the debt reduction. The debt reduction plan consists of reducing the net present value of
payments due. With a debt reduction agreement, the government pays back the reduced debt
to the creditors. The creditors, in turn, do not impose the direct sanctions on the country. Let
(1 − α(b,y)) denote the debt write-oﬀ in the debt reduction plan. Alternatively, the ratio α(b,y)
is the realized debt recovery rate. Once the reduced debt is fully repaid, the country regains its
access to the capital markets.
We model the debt renegotiation as a generalized Nash bargaining game.14 T h et h r e a tp o i n t
14Nash bargaining is eﬃcient and the debt reduction agreement is reached without any delay. This static
bargaining model in our paper provides a succinct framework to analyze the interaction between sovereign default
and debt renegotiation. The model can be extended to incorporate the strategic bargaining in a stochastic
environment.
10of the bargaining game is that the country stays in autarky and the creditors get nothing. The
expected value of autarky to the country, vaut (y), is given in a recursive form:










Note that permanent autarky implies that a country has no access to capital markets and faces
direction sanctions and faces output loss by the fraction of λd + λs.
We now specify the Nash bargaining problem. In a debt renegotiation, for any debt recovery
plan a, the surplus accruing to the sovereign government is the diﬀerence between the value of
accepting the deal and the value of rejecting it. We denote the country’s surplus by ∆B (a;b,y),













− vaut (y) (7)
The term in the bracket is the expected life-time utility of defaulting when the debt recovery rate
is a. The surplus to the country comes from two sources. First, the direct output loss is smaller
with the renegotiation agreement because no direct sanctions are imposed. Second, although the
country’s credit score becomes bad in the next period, the expected length of ﬁnancial exclusion
is ﬁnite. Thus, the defaulting country gains from losing the access to capital markets for a
temporary periods rather than permanently.
The surplus to the risk-neutral ﬁnancial intermediaries is the present value of recovered debt.
∆L (a;b,y)=−ab (8)
If the lenders can make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers, then they could extract debt repayments up
to the full amount of a country’s cost of default. If, on the other hand, the borrowing country
has all the bargaining power, then it gets a complete debt reduction in the bargaining. However,
a realistic debt renegotiation is not a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer from either party. We assume that
the borrower has a bargaining power θ and the lenders have a bargaining power (1 − θ).T h e
parameter of bargaining power θ summarizes the institutional arrangement of debt renegotiation.
To ensure that the bargaining problem is well deﬁned, restrictions on the bargaining power
parameter θ are required. We deﬁne the bargaining power set Θ ⊂ [0,1] such that for θ ∈ Θ
the renegotiation surplus has a unique optimum for any debt position b and endowment shock
y. Given the debt level b and endowment y, the debt recovery rate, α(b,y) which is a function
11of b and y, solves the following bargaining problem:








s.t. ∆B (a;b,y) ≥ 0
∆L (a;b,y) ≥ 0
The debt renegotiation determines the debt recovery schedule α(b,y) ∈ A. Because the value
of defaulting to the country depends on the bond price function and debt recovery rates, the
renegotiation is endogenous. The recovery schedule will be solved in the equilibrium.
One remark is that we assume the renegotiation takes place only once for one default event
and is costless. The empirical evidence shows that extended repeated renegotiations are seldom
observed. Our assumption keeps the model tractable to analyze the interaction between default
and renegotiation. An alternative way in modelling renegotiation is to allow for continuous
costly renegotiations. In that case, the number of rounds of bargaining is a state variable and
the pricing problem becomes quite complicated. The model in the paper is a special case where
most of the economic intuitions still hold. Allowing for continuous costless renegotiation will
generate either risk-free debt or no international lending.
3.3 International Financial Intermediaries’ Problem
Taking the bond price function as given, the ﬁnancial intermediaries choose the amount of debt








1+rb0 if b0 ≥ 0
[1−p(b0,y)+p(b0,y)·γ(b0,y)]
1+r (−b0) − q(b0,y)(−b0) if b0 < 0
(10)
where p(b0,y) is the expected probability of default for a country with an endowment y and
indebtedness b0,a n dγ (b0,y) is the expected recovery rate of such a debt contract.
Because we assume that the sovereign debt market is completely competitive, the ﬁnancial













(1+r) if b0 < 0
(11)
When the country lends to the intermediaries, b0 ≥ 0, default probability is zero. Thus the
s o v e r e i g nb o n dp r i c ei se q u a lt o 1
1+r, which is the price of a risk-free bond. In contrast when
the country borrows from the intermediaries, b0 < 0, there exist the risks of default and debt
restructuring. As a result, the sovereign bond is priced to compensate the ﬁnancial intermediaries
for bearing these risks. The default probability and expected debt recovery rate are endogenous,
12depending on the country’s incentive to default and renegotiation outcome.






interest rate on sovereign bonds, rs (b0,y)= 1
q(b0,y) − 1, is bounded below by the risk-free rate.
The diﬀerence between the country interest rate and the risk free rate is the country’s credit
spread , s(b0,y)=rs (b0,y) − r. We will focus on the dynamics of the sovereign credit spreads
in the subsequent quantitative analysis.
3.4 Recursive Equilibrium
We can now deﬁne a stationary recursive equilibrium in the model economy.
Deﬁnition 1 A recursive equilibrium is a set of functions for (i) the sovereign government’s
value function v∗ (b,h,y), asset holdings b0∗ (b,h,y),d e f a u l ts e tD∗ (b),c o n s u m p t i o nc∗ (b,h,y)
(ii) recovery rate α∗ (b,y) and (iii) pricing function q∗ (b,y) such that
1. Given the bond price function q∗ (b,y) and debt recovery rate α∗ (b,y),t h ec o u n t r y ’ s
asset holdings b0∗ (b,h,y), consumption c∗ (b,h,y) and default set D∗ (b) satisfy the sovereign
government’s optimization problem (2), (3), and (4).
2. Given the bond price function q∗ (b,y), the recovery rate α∗ (b,y) solves the debt renegoti-
ation problem (9).
3. Given the recovery rate α∗ (b,y0), the bond price function q∗ (b,y) satisﬁes the zero expected
proﬁt condition for intermediaries (11), where the default probability p∗ (b0,y) and expected recov-
ery rate γ∗ (b,y) are consistent with the sovereign’s default policy and renegotiation agreement.
In equilibrium, the default probability is related to the sovereign government’s default policy












When D∗ (b0)=∅, the country with debt b0 does not default for any realization of the
endowment shock. Hence, the equilibrium default probability is zero and the bond price is
1
1+r.W h e n D∗ (b0)=Y , the sovereign government always chooses to default regardless of the
endowment shock realization. Then the equilibrium default probability is equal to 1 and bond
price is simply the expected recovery rate. In the models with endogenous default but a full debt
discharge,15 bond prices are zero when default probability is one. In our model, however, the
recovery rate is endogenized. Therefore, bond prices may not be zero even when the sovereign
is expected to default with probability one.
15Examples are Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2002) on consumer default, and Arellano (2004)
and Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b) on sovereign default.
13The expected recovery rate is the expected proportion of defaulted debt that the ﬁnancial














The numerator is the expected proportion of debt that the investors can recover, and the de-
nominator is the default probability.
Before we establish the existence of a recursive equilibrium in the next subsection, two more
comments are in order. First, the debt recovery rate α (b,y) solves the Nash bargaining problem
in equilibrium. Therefore, the debt recovery rate α(b,y) is endogenous in equilibrium. If the
debt recovery rate function α (b,y) were given exogenously, we could deﬁne a partial equilibrium
in which conditions 1 and 3 are the only equilibrium conditions. As a special case, when α
(b,y)=0 , the equilibrium is similar to the ones in Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull
(2002), Arellano (2004) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b). Second, both the government and
intermediaries take the debt recovery function as given and behave optimally. At the same
time, the debt recovery rate solves the ex post debt renegotiation after default. Therefore, the
equilibrium is subgame perfect.
3.5 Existence and Characterization of a Recursive Equilibrium
In the model, the sovereign government decides to default or to repay its debt. At the same
time the post-default debt reduction is determined endogenously through debt renegotiation.
Due to the introduction of discrete default decision and an endogenous bargaining problem, the
existence of a dynamic recursive equilibrium does not follow from a standard argument. In this
subsection, we ﬁrst establish the existence of a recursive equilibrium and then demonstrate some
of its properties.
3.5.1 Existence of Equilibrium
Theorem 1 Given any bargaining power θ ∈ Θ, a recursive equilibrium exists.
Proof. We give a sketch of the proof and defer the details of the proof to the Appendix. The
proof consists of three steps. First, given any debt recovery rate schedule α(b,y) ∈ A,w es h o w
that there exists a bond price function q(b0,y) ∈ Q that is consistent with the government’s
default policy and the ﬁnancial intermediaries’ zero expected proﬁt condition.16 Second, given
16When debt recovery rate is taken as exogenous, the partial equilibrium for the model is similar to the one
in Chatterjee et al (2002). They show that for atomless endowment distribution and no tie-breaking rule for
14any bond price schedule q(b0,y) ∈ Q, we show that there exists a debt recovery schedule α(b,y) ∈
A that solves the Nash bargaining problem. Lastly, we demonstrate that an equilibrium bond
price function and an equilibrium debt recovery schedule exist.
(1) Taking any debt recovery schedule α(b,y) ∈ A as given, we deﬁne a price correspondence







⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(1 − p(q)(b0,y;α))/(1 + r)
+p(q)(b0,y;α) · γ (q)(b0,y;α)/(1 + r)
if b0 ≥ 0
1/(1 + r) if b0 ≤ 0
(14)
where p(q)(b0,y;α) and γ (q)(b0,y;α) satisfy (12) and (13).T h u s , ϕ(q)(b0,y;α) is the set of
prices for a debt contract of type (b0,y) that are consistent with zero proﬁts given the price
function q. We can show that the bond price correspondence ϕ(q) has a closed graph and is
convex-valued. Then via Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem, the correspondence has a ﬁxed point
q = ϕ(q)(b0,y;α), which is an equilibrium bond price function, given the debt recovery schedule
α.
(2) Taking any bond price function q(b,y) ∈ Q as given, we ﬁrst deﬁne a debt recovery
schedule correspondence ψ (α) that takes point in A.








s.t. ∆B (a;b,y,q,α) ≥ 0
∆L (a;b,y,q,α) ≥ 0
ψ(α)(b,y;q) is the set of deb recovery rates for debt contract of type (b,y) that are consistent
with Nash bargaining game, given debt recovery schedule α.W ec a ns h o wt h a tt h ed e b tr e c o v -
ery function correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. Since θ ∈ Θ,t h es o l u t i o nψ(α)(b,y;q) is
unique, thus is a continuous function. Then via Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem, the correspon-
dence ψ(α) has a ﬁxed point α = ψ(α)(b,y;q), which is an equilibrium debt recovery schedule,
given the bond price function q.






defaulting and not defaulting, equilibrium bond price schedule exists.
15We can show that the correspondence T (q,α) has a closed graph and is convex valued. Therefore,
we can apply Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem and show the existence of a ﬁxed point.
T (q∗,α)(b,y)=( q∗,α ∗)
Thus, a recursive equilibrium exists.
3.5.2 Properties of the Equilibrium
We can proceed to establish some properties of a recursive equilibrium. First, we can characterize
the sovereign government’s value function v(b,h,y) under the following condition.
Condition 1 Debt recovery schedule α(b,y) ∈ A satisﬁes
α(b1,y)b1 ≤ α(b2,y)b2 (16)
for all y ∈ Y and bmin ≤ b1 ≤ b2 < 0.
This condition implies that the absolute value of reduced debt is increasing in the amount
of defaulted debt. This condition is intuitive and, as we will show below, is satisﬁed by the
equilibrium debt recovery rate. The set of debt recovery rate α(b,y) that satisﬁes condition 1
is denoted by A;t h a ti s ,
A = {α|α ∈ A such that α(b1,y)b1 ≥ α(b2,y)b2 for b1 ≤ b2 < 0}
Theorem 2 Given any debt recovery schedule α ∈ A, the sovereign government’s value function
v(b,h,y) is increasing in b.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As a result of the debt renegotiation, the debt recovery rate α(b,y) optimally divides the
bargaining surplus. The surplus to the ﬁnancial intermediaries, ∆L (a;b,y), is a linearly de-
creasing function of the country’s debt b. By Theorem 2, the sovereign borrower’s surplus
∆B (α(b,y);b,y) is an increasing function of b, given the debt recovery rate α(b,y) ∈ A.T h e r e
are two special cases in the Nash bargaining game. If the sovereign borrower’s bargaining power
θ is large enough, the total surplus is an increasing function of α(b,y)b. In this case, a full debt
discharge is optimal so that α(b,y)=0 .I fθ is suﬃciently small, the total surplus is a decreasing
function of α(b,y)b. In this case, the debt recovery rate is α(b,y)=1 ; the creditors do not
agree on any debt reduction. The analysis in the following theorem generalizes the solution to
the Nash bargaining problem for bargaining power θ in the set Θ.
16Theorem 3 For a bargaining power θ ∈ Θ, there exists a threshold b(y) ≤ 0 such that the
equilibrium debt recovery function α satisﬁes
α∗ (b,y)=
½b(y)
b if b ≤ b(y)
1 if b ≥ b(y)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for Theorem 3 is the following: The beneﬁt to the defaulting country of paying
oﬀ their debt depends on the expected duration of ﬁnancial exclusion, which is determined by the
total amount of reduced debt. On the other side of the renegotiation, the ﬁnancial intermediaries
are also solely concerned with the total recovery on defaulted debt. Therefore, the bargaining
problem is equivalent to the one with the reduced debt as the renegotiation subject. We ﬁnd
that there is an optimal value of reduced debt as a threshold, and that there is no debt reduction
for debt levels smaller than the threshold. A similar result is found in Cole, Dow and English
(1995), which studies the role of debt renegotiation settlement in signalling a government’s type.
An immediate result following the above theorem is that an equilibrium debt recovery function
is in the set A.
Corollary 1 An equilibrium debt recovery schedule α∗ (b,y) satisﬁes Condition (1).
Now we can analyze the sovereign government’s debt policy in equilibrium. The government’s
incentive to default depends on the ex post renegotiation agreement on debt reduction. Given
the equilibrium debt recovery schedule α(b,y), characterized by Theorem 3, and the endowment
shock y, the value function of a defaulting country is independent of the level of debt if it is larger
than b(y). Therefore, we can show that the maximal default set increases with the country’s
indebtedness and the equilibrium default probability increases with the level of debt.
Theorem 4 Given an equilibrium debt recovery schedule α∗ (b,y) and an endowment y ∈ Y ,








Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 5 Given an equilibrium debt recovery schedule α∗ (b,y) and an endowment y ∈ Y ,







for b0 <b 1 ≤ b(y) ≤ 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Given the endogenous debt recovery rates, our model predicts that default probability in-
creases with the level of debt. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Chatterjee, Cobae, Nakajima and
17Vios-Rull (2002) and Arellano (2004) all obtain similar results, although they assume a zero
debt recovery rate and rule out the possibility of debt renegotiation.
We can also characterize the equilibrium bond price schedule.








Proof. See Appendix A.
In equilibrium, the sovereign bond prices depend on both the risk of default and the expected
debt recovery rates. By the theorems above, for a high level of debt, the default probability is
higher, but the expected debt recovery rate is lower. Therefore, equilibrium bond prices decrease
with indebtedness. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence, for example, b (1984).
The next theorem characterizes the debt arrear repayment policy for a defaulting country.

































then for all b ∈ B−− and b>e b, it is strictly optimal for the defaulting country to repay its debt
arrear in full, and for all b ∈ B−− and b<e b, a partial repayment is strictly optimal.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This theorem implies that for all b ∈ B−−, if the sovereign government fully repays the debt
arrear b and regains access to ﬁnancial markets for next period, then it also chooses to do so
with a lower level of debt arrear. If the government decides not to repay the debt in full, it will
do the same for higher debt arrear. In this case, it will take the country at least more than
one period to re-enter the ﬁnancial market after default. With the above theorem, the expected
duration of ﬁnancial exclusion increases with the amount of debt arrear.
A last remark about the theoretical model concerns the number of equilibria in the model
economy. We cannot show the uniqueness of equilibrium in the model. There may exist many
types of equilibria: one equilibrium implies high default risk, low debt recovery rates, and
corresponding low bond price schedule; another equilibrium may support low default risk, high
debt recovery rates, and high bond price schedule. However, we cannot formally establish the
existence of multiple equilibria. The above equilibrium properties apply to all the equilibria. In
the subsequent quantitative analysis, we compute an equilibrium as a ﬁxed point starting with
high debt recovery rates and high bond prices.
184 Quantitative Analysis
In the quantitative analysis, we examine whether the model can account for the debt crises and
the dynamics of sovereign bond interest rates for emerging economies. We calibrate the model
to analyze quantitatively the sovereign debt of Argentina.
4.1 Calibration
We deﬁne one period as a quarter. We assume the period utility function for the sovereign





where σ is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion. We set the risk aversion coeﬃcient to 2, which is
standard in the macroeconomics literature.
We calibrate the endowment process to the Argentine output. The Argentine output, plotted
in Figure 2, is characterized by a stochastic trend. Therefore, we model the output growth rate





logµg + ρg loggt−1 + ε
g
t (19)
where growth rate gt =
yt








and logµg is the expected log growth
rate of the country’s endowment. The quarterly output data are seasonally adjusted real GDP
for the period of 1980Q1 to 2003Q4 from the Ministry of Finance (MECON). We estimate the
endowment process to match the average growth rate, as well as the standard deviation and
autocorrelation of HP detrended output.17 We conduct Cochrane’s (1988) variance ratio test
using the Argentine output data and the model simulation. The result (Figure 3) shows that
the estimated endowment process captures the stochastic trend in the data.
Because a realization of the growth shock permanently aﬀects endowment, the model econ-
omy is nonstationary. In the quantitative analysis, we detrend the model by the lagged endow-




The normalization by yt−1 ensures that if xt is in the agent’s information set at t,s oi st h e
detrended variable b xt.
The risk-free interest rate r is the cost of capital for intermediaries to engage in the interna-
17Aguiar and Gopinath (2004a) ﬁnd that emerging economies are subject to substantial volatility in the trend
growth rate. Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b) use an endowment process with stochastic trend to analyze sovereign
default and interest rates.
19tional ﬁnancial markets. In the benchmark economy, the risk-free interest rate r is a constant.
We set r to 1%, the average quarterly yield on 3 month US treasury bills. When a country
defaults, its output drops by a fraction λd. Sturzenegger (2002) estimates the percentage of
output contraction after default using a panel of 100 countries, and ﬁnds that the output loss is
equal to 2%. Accordingly we set λd =2 % .
In the last part of the calibration, we pick the time discount factor β, sovereign government’s
bargaining power θ, and direct sanctions λs to match the average default frequency, average
debt recovery rate, and debt-to-output ratio of Argentina. Because the country could default
in equilibrium, default and debt renegotiation are the equilibrium outcome, which is consistent
with the data. Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savastano (2003) report four episodes of sovereign defaults
in Argentina’s external debt from 1824 to 1999. In 2001, Argentina defaulted a ﬁf t ht i m eo ni t s
external debts, making its average default frequency 2.78% annually or 0.694% quarterly.18 The
average debt recovery rate is estimated as the ﬁrst available bid price for sovereign bonds 30
days after default. According to the Moody’s (2003) report on average defaulted debt recovery
rates for sovereign issuers, Argentina’s average recovery rate is 28%.19 We use the foreign debt
service-to-output ratio as one of the target statistics. The debt service-to-output ratio includes
both short term debt and debt service on long term debt, which is calculated using data from
the World Bank. For the period 1980-2003, the ratio of Argentina’s debt service to its gross
national income is 9.538%.
We use the simulated method of moments (SMM) to estimate the time discount factor β,t h e
bargaining power θ, and the direct sanctions λs. These three parameters are estimated jointly
because the target statistics are endogenous in equilibrium. Table 1 presents the statistics for
Argentina that we use as the calibration target. Table 2 summarizes the calibration results.
The time discount factor β is 0.740. This high degree of impatience helps to generate the high
default probability.20 It also reﬂects the high political instability in Argentina over the past years
where there have been 14 presidents from 1981 to 2004.21 Therefore, the government’s quarterly
survival probability is 84.7%, which makes the value of pure time discount factor 0.873.22 The
output loss due to trade sanctions, 1.22%, shows that the creditors have some power to impose
direct sanctions on the country. Notice, however, that the eﬀect of direct sanctions on output is
less than the output drop due to a bad reputation. Finally, the estimated Argentina’s bargaining
18Reinhart (2001) estimates an unconditional default probability for a sample of 56 emerging economies from
1970 to 1999. Her result implies that the average annual default probability is 0.12%.
19In the recent proposal of bond exchanges for the Argentine defaulted debt, the recovery value is 25%. The
country average recovery rate is higher at 41% in Moody’s (2003).
20Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2002) study a similar model to the case of U.S. consumer default
and ﬁnd the time discount factor to be 0.819 in their calibration. Their default rate statistic is 0.5%. Argentina’s
annual default probability is much higher at 2.78%, so the low discount rate of 0.740 is needed.
21Argentina has 72 presidents/governments in power from 1833 to 2004
22S e eG r o s s m a na n dV a nH u y c k( 1 9 8 8 )
20power is 0.83, which shows that it has a more favorable position in debt renegotiation than the
international investors.
4.2 Comparison of Model to Data
After calibrating the parameters to match the Argentine economy, we simulate the model and
compare the results with the Argentine data. Table 3 compares the data with the model statis-
tics. The statistics are calculated from 2000 simulations of 50 observations each. In each sim-
ulation, we simulate the model for 1000 periods and extract the last 50 observations to explore
the behavior of the stationary distribution of the model economy.
Overall, the model matches the Argentine interest rate volatility, consumption volatility, and
the correlations between interest rates, output, consumption and current account. We also show
that the model can replicate the recent default crises and the time series of the Argentine interest
rate over the past 10 years.
The bond spreads are quarterly spreads for Argentine foreign bonds with the maturity of
three year from 1994Q1 to 2001Q3, taken from Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2004).23 They
compute the spread curve with maturities of 3, 6, 9, and 12 years using a modiﬁed term structure
model developed by Nelson and Siegel (1987) and Diebold and Li (2004). As discussed in Broner,
Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2004), the sovereign bond spreads have a signiﬁcant term structure
variation. The average bond spreads and volatility for Argentine foreign bonds decrease with
the maturity for the period of 1994Q1 to 2001Q3.24 Because the calibrated model generates
interest rates for 3-month bonds, we compare the model result to the bond spreads data with
short maturity.25
The model simulation closely matches the volatility of the Argentine interest rates in the data,
which is hard to explain in the literature. The model can account for about 78% of volatility
in the 3-year bond spreads in the data. This improves the result in the previous models on
sovereign bonds pricing without endogenous debt renegotiation.26 The bond spreads in our
model are jointly determined by the default probabilities and debt recovery rates. Therefore,
allowing for debt renegotiation breaks the one-to-one matching from default probabilities to bond
spreads even though lenders are risk neutral. Because the debt recovery rates are endogenous
and are correlated with default probability, our model can generate more volatile bond spreads.
23We are grateful to Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler for kindly providing their dataset on sovereign bond
spread curve.
24According to the estimated bond spread curve in Broner, Lorezoni and Schmukler (2004), the average quarterly
bond spreads increase from 1.02 to 1.56 from 3-year bonds to 12-year bonds. The volatilities increase from 0.42%
to 0.78% from 3-year bonds to 12-year bonds.
25T h ec o m m o n l yu s e dJ . P .M o r g a n ’ sE m e r g i n gM a r k e t sB o n dI n d i c e si sc a l c u l a t e du s i n gb o n d sw i t hal o n g
maturity of 7-10 years on average.
26Arellano (2004) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b) ﬁnd that their equilibrium models cannot generate high
interest rate volatility.
21In particular, default probability is higher when a larger fraction of debt reduction is expected
in the post-default renegotiation. Therefore, the endogenous debt renegotiation ampliﬁes the
default risk and thus the volatility of bond spreads. We will explore the eﬀect of endogenous
debt renegotiation in generating high volatility of bond spreads in the next section.
The average quarterly bond spreads is 0.46% in the simulation, which is about 50% of the
mean spreads for 3-year bonds in the data. Although this shows that our model falls short in this
regard, the simulated average bond spreads are conceivably higher than the results in Arellano
(2004) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b). In our model, the mean spread is equal to the product
of average default probability and average debt reduction rate in the model. Since the default
frequency in the data is 0.695% and the average debt reduction rate is 72%, the mean of bond
spreads due to default risk and restructuring risk is about 0.5% for 3-month bonds. Data on
3-month bond spreads is desirable to assess the ability of such models in explaining sovereign
bond spreads. On corporate bonds, Huang and Huang (2003) ﬁnd that credit risk account only
for 19% of the yield observed in investment grade corporate bonds.
A third result is that the model accounts for the relation between bond spreads, outputs
and current account. Current account data is from the Ministry of Finance (MECON) for
1980Q1 to 2003Q4 and is calculated as a ratio of output. Bond spreads are negatively correlated
w i t ho u t p u ta n dp o s i t i v e l yc o r r e l a t e dw i t hc u r r e nt account. Moreover, current account is also
countercyclical in the model, although the magnitude of correlation in the model is lower than
in the data. These results imply that the country borrows more in good times at a lower bond
spreads. Because the growth shock is persistent in the model, when the country gets a good
shock today, its permanent income increases even more. Therefore, the country has an incentive
to borrow more. The equilibrium bond spreads increase with the level of debt. However, bond
spreads also decrease with output because the bond price schedule shifts up with lower default
risk and higher expected debt recovery rates. The equilibrium outcome indicates that the shift
in bond price schedule dominates. Therefore, bond spreads are countercyclical and positively
correlated with current account. Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b) explore this eﬀect in a sovereign
default model with shocks to endowment growth.
The model also generates volatile consumption and current account at the business cycle
frequency. The volatility of consumption using seasonally adjusted consumption data from the
Ministry of Finance (MECON) for 1980Q1 to 2003Q4. Consumption volatility is higher than
output volatility in the data, which is a common feature of emerging economies as documented by
Neumeyer and Perri (2004). Our model can account for such consumption volatility. The reason
why consumption volatility is higher endowment volatility in our model is that the endowment
process has a stochastic trend. Because a good endowment shock increases permanent income
more than proportionally, the country borrows to smooth consumption. Therefore, consumption
is more volatile than endowment. This is also explained in Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b).
22Regarding the current account volatility, the model fails to generate volatile current account as
in the data. Because the model replicates a low level of international borrowing, the magnitude
of current account is small. Therefore, the volatility of current account is smaller than the data.
To better understand the bond pricing mechanism in the model, we plot the bond price,
default probability, and debt recovery rate schedule in equilibrium. Figure 4 shows the bond
price function faced by a country with the highest and the lowest endowment shock in the current
period. The bond price is increasing with the level of assets-to-output ratio (decreasing in the
level of debt-to-output ratio), which reﬂects our theoretical result and is consistent with the
data. Regarding the endowment shock, when the country has a good economic shock, it faces a
larger bond price.
Figure 5 plots the default probabilities. For a country with a very low debt-to-output ratio,
there is virtually no default, regardless of the value of the economic shock. Consistent with
the theory, as the indebtedness increases, the default probability increases. We also ﬁnd that
the default probability is higher for a country that experiences a bad growth shock. When a
country in debt gets a bad shock, default is more likely. This relationship helps to generate the
countercyclicality of interest rates.
Figure 6 plots the debt recovery schedule. For the defaulting country with a good shock, the
debt recovery rate is higher, and vice versa. This relation between recovery rate with output
is intuitive: a country which defaults with a good economic shock is asked to pay more. Such
a result contributes to the countercyclicality of interest rates because the ex ante incentive to
default depends on ex post debt reduction. When the country gets a bad shock, the beneﬁt
from defaulting is higher partly with a higher debt reduction. Therefore, the default risk is even
higher. A higher default probability and a lower debt recovery rate generate a higher sovereign
bond spread, thus a negative correlation between spreads and endowment.
Figure 6 also displays the model prediction regarding the relation between debt recovery
rates and the level of debt. If a country defaults with a small amount of debt, there is no
debt reduction . As the amount of defaulted debt increases, the debt recovery rate decreases.
Due to the limited availability of data on sovereign debt renegotiation, there is little empirical
evidence on the property of debt recovery rate. However, some observations from the recent
sovereign bond exchanges are largely consistent with the model prediction. For example, the
bond exchanges by Ukraine, Uruguay, and Pakistan achieved no debt reduction because the
eligible debt is very small, less than $5.4 billion. The cases of Ecuador $6.7 billion bond exchange
and Russian $31.8 billion bond exchange resulted in 40% and 36.5% debt reduction respectively.
The current renegotiation for Argentina $82.2 billion is expected to result in a debt reduction
of 75%. Therefore, the model prediction is roughly consistent with the empirical observation.
The model successfully predicts the recent Argentine debt crisis and replicates the time
series of the Argentine bond spreads. We feed the Argentine GDP growth rate into the model
23and compare the time series of bond spreads. Figure 7 plots the H-P detrended output, the 3
year Argentine bond spreads, and the simulated bond spreads over the period of 1994Q2 and
2001Q4. The ﬁgure demonstrates that the model can explain the recent Argentinian default
episode. Before a default occurs, the country faces countercyclical interest rates. When the
country gets a really bad shock, it defaults on its sovereign debt.
Regarding the endogenous length of punishment, the country receives one period ﬁnancial
exclusion after default in the model. Because the country has a high bargaining power and gets
a high debt reduction, the beneﬁt of paying back a small debt arrear to gain access to capital
markets outweighs the cost of reducing current consumption. Therefore, the model predicts
that the country returns to the market in one period. Gelos et al (2003) ﬁnd that it takes less
than one year for defaulted countries to regain access to international ﬁnancial markets in the
1990s. Since the renegotiation agreement in the model is reached right after default, the length
of ﬁnancial exclusion in the model is shorter than what they ﬁnd.27
5 Additional Model Implications
In this section, we explore the role of endogenous recovery rates and examine how the equilibrium
changes with the bargaining power. Results of sensitivity analysis are also presented.
5.1 Role of Endogenous Debt Renegotiation
We study the role of endogenous debt renegotiation by comparing our model to the one without
renegotiation. In the comparison model, default leads to a full debt discharge and the defaulting
country regains access to the capital markets with an exogenous return probability.28 Com-
plete debt discharge corresponds to an exogenous zero debt recovery rate α =0in our model.
An exogenous return probability δ determines the expected length of exclusion from ﬁnancial
markets.
We calibrate the time discount factor and the return probability in the model without rene-
gotiation to match the target statistics of average default frequency and debt-to-output ratio.
The estimated time discount factor is 0.768, and the return probability is 0.274. The other
parameters take the same values as in benchmark model. Table 4 summarizes the results from
our model and the comparison model without renegotiation.
The calibration of the comparison model does not match the target statistics. In particular,
the model without renegotiation generates signiﬁcantly lower default frequency than what we see
27We get longer periods of ﬁnancial exclusion in the sensitivity analysis when the country has lower bargaining
power.
28Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2002), Arellano (2004), Aguiar and Gopinath (2004b) apply the
comparison model to study consumer default and sovereign default, respectively.
24in the data. It implicates that endogenous renegotiation is needed to account for the observed
high default frequency for Argentina. The comparison model also generates a lower level and
volatility of Argentine bond spreads. Although the ﬁnancial intermediaries do not recover any
fraction of the defaulted debt, the sovereign bonds bear lower interest rates due to a smaller
default risk in this case. In equilibrium, the sovereign government is more willing to accumulate
debt with a less strict borrowing condition, and the country’s consumption is less volatile.
Regarding the volatility of bond spreads, because default risk is the sole determinant of the
bond price, and in equilibrium default is a rare event, the simulated bond spreads are not
volatile enough. In contrast, our model with endogenous renegotiation generates higher default
probability and exacerbates interest rate volatility.29
5.2 Bargaining Power and Collective Action Clauses
In this subsection, we compute the model economy for diﬀerent bargaining powers. The results
are summarized in Table 5. The bargaining power parameter has a direct impact on debt recovery
rate. It is intuitive that higher bargaining power for the country implies less debt recovery
for ﬁnancial intermediaries. Keeping other things ﬁxed, the lower recovery rate increases the
average bond interest rates. On the other hand, for a higher bargaining power for the country,
the corresponding decreased debt recovery rate makes the bond price schedule shift down. As a
result, borrowing is discouraged and thus the equilibrium debt-to-output ratio is smaller. Also,
with more restricted borrowing terms, the default probability goes down and the bond interest
rates decreases, ceteris paribus. Therefore, the increasing bargaining power for the country
has two opposite eﬀects on the bond interest rates. How the equilibrium interest rates change
depends on which eﬀect dominates. Table 5 shows that the average interest rates do not change
monotonically with the bargaining powers.
For a country with full bargaining power, the debt renegotiation always results in a zero
debt recovery rates. In this case, the bond price schedule shifts so that borrowing cost increases
dramatically. The debt-to-output ratio is 2% and default probability is 0.02%. When the country
has little bargaining power, for example θ =0 .35, the debt recovery rate is very high. In this
case, the bond price, as a function of indebtedness, becomes much ﬂatter, given the endowment
shock. Figure 8 plots the bond price schedule. Therefore, the model with debt renegotiation can
potentially generate a wider range of debt-to-output ratio, as shown for θ =0 .35.
The results in Table 5 with diﬀerent bargaining powers can be viewed as outcomes of policy
experiments. To evaluate the impact of diﬀerent policy on the sovereign country’s welfare,
we also calculate the country’s ex ante utilitarian welfare in the stationary distribution. The
29Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2004) endogenize the value of repudiation for entrepreneurs with optimal
ﬁnancial contracts. They ﬁnd that economies with low enforceability of contracts have greater macroeconomic
volatility.
25country gets higher utility when it has a higher bargaining power. We also calculate the change
in consumption that makes the country indiﬀerent between the model economy with a given
bargaining power and the benchmark economy. As discussed in Athreya (2002), we denote the
change in consumption φ.L e tΛ0 denote benchmark welfare, and Λp denote welfare in the model
economy with a given bargaining power. φ satisﬁes the following:
φ =
µ
Λp +1 /(1 − σ)(1− β)
Λ0 +1 /(1 − σ)(1− β)
¶1/(1−α)
− 1
If φ>0, the country is better oﬀ with the new bargaining power than in the benchmark case.
The converse also holds.
Our results shed light on the impact of reform in sovereign bond restructuring on the inter-
national ﬁnancial market. Recently, voluntary and market-friendly debt restructuring clauses in
bond contracts are viewed as an improvement of the current debt restructuring process. One
example is the use of Collective Action Clauses (CACs), the contractual clauses that allow the
terms of contract to change if there is consent from a predetermined supermajority of bond
holders. Because sovereign bond holders are diverse, and one investor may only hold a small
fraction of debt, in the event of default one investor would always ﬁnd it incentive compatible
to hold the debt rather than cooperate in the renegotiation process. This "hold out", or free
riding problem results in a very costly renegotiation and reduces the country’s bargaining power.
However, CACs can align bondholders’ incentives to ease the renegotiation process by specifying
a majority rule that binds all bondholders to eliminate the hold out problem. Several empiri-
cal studies analyze the market impact of CACs inclusion. Eichengreen and Mody (2000) show
that bonds with CACs have higher yields. Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (2003) argue that
bond prices are not aﬀected much by the CACs. However, these exercises suﬀer from the Lucas
critique. Through the experiments on our model, we ﬁnd that when the sovereign borrower
has higher bargaining power, the country’s borrowing cost does not necessarily increase. The
amount of sovereign debt issued on the market is also aﬀected and the extent of risk sharing
diﬀers with the bargaining power. Although our model does not have a structural bargaining
game, it points out the priority to analyze default and renegotiation in a dynamic framework to
evaluate the impact of renegotiation reforms.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We study the sensitivity of our model to some key structural parameter values. First we study the
eﬀect of risk free interest rates on the model. The ﬁrst panel in Table 6 reports the results. For
a higher risk-free interest rate, the average recovery rate is smaller because the intermediaries’
cost of capital is higher. The renegotiation results in a higher default loss for impatient lenders.
26For the country, a higher risk free rate implies higher borrowing costs as well as a better debt
renegotiation deal. In general, the country borrows less and the default probability decreases.
The combined eﬀect of the default risk and a smaller recovery rate is that the bond interest rate
increases with the risk free rate, but less proportionally. This is consistent with what Eichengreen
and Mody (1998) ﬁnd in their empirical study of sovereign bond spreads.
The results in the benchmark model are sensitive to the choice of time discount factor, as
shown in the second panel in Table 6. On the debt renegotiation, a more patient country gets
less debt reduction. Because the patient sovereign government cares more about the reentry to
capital markets in the future, the value of renegotiation agreement is relatively higher than the
cost of repaying more reduced debt. Therefore, the bargaining results in a higher recovery rate.
Default probability also decreases when the country is more patient because the intertemporal
consumption smoothing is highly valued. Accordingly, the average sovereign spreads decrease
with discount factor.
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of the model to changes in default punishment. First,
We compare the benchmark model with the case when the creditors do not have any sanction
technology beyond the ability to cease lending to the defaulted country. That is, λs =0 . Because
the sovereign government implicitly has a higher value at its threat point. Therefore, the debt
renegotiation results in a smaller recovery rate and the bond price schedule shifts down. In this
case, the country’s debt-to-output ratio is lower and defaults less frequently. Table 6 shows that
the average interest rate is lower in this experiment. Regarding the output loss due to default,
we ﬁnd that an increase in this output loss decreases default probability. But the debt recovery
rate decrease because the creditors’ direction sanctions λs becomes relatively less important.
As a result, the debt-to-output ratio increases. At the same time, the interest rate volatility
decreases.
6C o n c l u s i o n
It is well observed that sovereign debt crises have a great impact on the borrowing countries
and international capital markets. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the sovereign default
risk and the role of debt crises resolution in the sovereign debt markets. This paper studies
sovereign default and debt renegotiation in a small open economy model. This model allows us
to investigate the interaction between default and debt renegotiation within a dynamic borrowing
framework. We ﬁnd that debt recovery rates decrease with indebtedness and, in turn, aﬀect the
country’s ex ante incentive to default. In equilibrium, sovereign bonds are priced to compensate
creditors for the risks of default and restructuring. Consistent with the empirical evidence, the
model predicts that interest rates increase with the level of debt.
We use the model to analyze quantitatively the sovereign debt of Argentina. The model
27successfully accounts for the high bond spreads, countercyclical country interest rates, and other
key features of the Argentine economy. The model also replicates the dynamics of bond interest
rates during the recent Argentine debt crisis. Furthermore, we show that the introduction of
an endogenous debt recovery schedule leads to a higher default probability and greater interest
rate volatility. We also demonstrate that the changes in bargaining power have a great impact
on debt recovery rates as well as on the sovereign bond spreads, shedding light on the policy
implications of sovereign debt restructuring procedure. In particular, we ﬁnd that the sovereign
bond spreads do not increase monotonically with the bargaining power.
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32Statistics Source Data Model
Panel A
World risk-free interest rate US Treasury-bill quarterly interest rates 1% 1%
Output loss in debt crises Sturzenegger (2002) 2% 2%
Panel B
Average output growth rate MECON 0.420% 0.420%
Output standard deviation MECON 4.346% 4.346%
Output autocorrelation MECON 0.824 0.824
Panel C
Average debt service/output the World Bank 9.538% 9.695%
Default frequency Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savastano (2003) 0.695% 0.540%
Average recovery rate Moody’s (2003) 28% 28%
Table 1: Target Statistics for Argentina (1980.1-2003.4)
Parameter Symbol Value
Panel A
Coeﬃcient of Risk Aversion σ 2
Risk Free Interest Rate r 1%
Output Loss in Default λd 2%
Panel B
Average Endowment Growth µg 1.004
Std Dev. to Endowment Growth Shock σg 0.025
Endowment Growth AR(1) coeﬃcient ρg 0.406
Panel C
Time Discount Factor β 0.740
Sanction Threat λs 1.221%
Bargaining Power θ 0.832
Table 2: Model Parameter Values in the Model
33Non-target Statistics Data Model
Average Bond Spreads (quarterly) 1.02% 0.46%
Bond Spreads Std. Dev.(quarterly) 0.42% 0.33%
Correlation between Bond Spreads and Output -0.12 -0.18
Correlation between Bond Spreads and Current Account 0.49 0.54
Correlation between Current Account and Output -0.88 -0.14
Consumption Std. Dev./Output Std. Dev. 1.15 1.03
Current Account Std. Dev. 1.35 0.58
Table 3: Model Statistics for Argentina
Note: Bond spreads series are quarterly spreads for Argentine foreign bonds with maturity of
three year from 1994Q1 to 2001Q3. Output and consumption are log HP ﬁltered. Current
account is the ratio of trade balance to output and is HP detrended.
34Target Statistics Data Model Comparison Model
Default Probability 0.69% 0.54% 0.191%
Average Debt Service/Output 9.54% 9.69% 10.24%
Other Statistics
Average Recovery Rate 28% 28% 0
Average Bond Spreads 1.02% 0.46% 0.10%
Bond Spreads Std. 0.42% 0.33% 0.13%
Consumption Std./Output Std. 1.15 1.03 1.01
Table 4: Role of Endogenous Renegotiation
Note: The default frequency is the quarterly average from 1824 to 2003. Bond spreads series
are quarterly spreads for Argentine foreign bonds with maturity of three year from 1994Q1 to













θ=0.35 89.01% 93.14% 1.339% 0.315% -0.208 -0.356%
θ=0.7 33.68% 13.46% 0.33% 1.24% -0.008 -0.034%
θ=0.83 27.93% 9.69% 0.54% 1.46% -0.007 —
θ=0.9 19.64% 7.83% 0.33% 1.31% -0.006 0.025%
θ=1 0 2.25% 0.02% 1.03% -0.005 0.062%
Table 5: Statistics for Diﬀerent Bargaining Powers
Note: The default frequency is the quarterly average from 1824 to 2003. Bond spreads series
are quarterly spreads for Argentine foreign bonds with maturity of three year from 1994Q1 to
2001Q3. Output and consumption are log HP ﬁltered.
36Default prob. Recovery rate debt/output Mean ss Std.(rs)
Risk free rate
r = 0.01 0.540% 27.930% 9.689% 0.460% 0.325%
r =0 .02 0.193% 27.366% 8.985% 0.148% 0.094%
r =0 .03 0.105% 27.739% 8.742% 0.079% 0.077%
Time discount factor
β = 0.74 0.540% 27.930% 9.689% 0.460% 0.325%
β =0 .8 0.333% 34.153% 9.823% 0.234% 0.115%
β =0 .9 0.099% 47.947% 11.770% 0.051% 0.029%
Endowment loss
λs= 0.012 0.540% 27.930% 9.689% 0.460% 0.325%
λs =0 0.175% 26.299% 9.130% 0.164% 0.178%
λd= 0.02 0.540% 27.930% 9.689% 0.460% 0.325%
λd =0 .03 0.306% 23.541% 14.239% 0.271% 0.146%
λd =0 .04 0.173% 21.488% 18.963% 0.157% 0.128%
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis for Benchmark Model
Note: Output and consumption are log HP ﬁltered.
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1. chooses to default or not (h’) 
2. debt renegotiation if defaults 
    debt is reduced to α(b,y)b 
3. chooses b’ if not to default 
state: b, h=0,  
y drawn from µ(yt|yt-1) 
state: b, h=1,  
y drawn from µ(yt|yt-1) 
1.chooses how much to pay (b’) 
2. h’=0 if b’=0 
Figure 1: Timeline of the Model
Note: The upper panel plots the timing of events within one period for a country
with a good credit score (h =0 )a n da s s e tp o s i t i o nb. The lower panel plots the






































Figure 2: Log Real GDP of Argentina, 1980.1-2003.4
The ﬁgure plots the log real GDP for Argentina from 1980Q1 to 2003Q4. The output
data is taken from MECON and is seasonally adjusted.









Figure 3: Variance Ratio for Argentine GDP, 1980.1-2003.4
The ﬁgure plots the variance ratio of output in the data and in the model simulation.
Variance ratio is calculated as1/k times the variance of k-diﬀerences of output divided
by variance of ﬁrst diﬀerence, as deﬁned in Cochrane (1988). The solid line shows the
variance ratio from the data, and the dashed lines show the one standard error band.


























Figure 4: Bond Price in Benchmark Model
Note: The ﬁgure shows the bond price as a function of assets for the highest and
lowest value of endowment shock. The solid line corresponds to bond price function
with the low endowment shock (bad state), and the dashed line corresponds to the



































Figure 5: Default Probability in Benchmark Model
The ﬁgure plots the default probability as a function of assets for the highest and
lowest value of endowment shock. The solid line corresponds to default probability
function with the low endowment shock (bad state), and the dashed line corresponds


































Figure 6: Recovery Rate in Benchmark Model
The ﬁgure plots the debt recovery rates as a function of assets for the highest and
lowest value of endowment shock. The solid line shows the debt recovery rates
function with the low endowment shock (bad state), and the dashed line corresponds





















































Bond spreads (data) Bond spreads (model)
Output (data/model, right scale)
Figure 7: Output and Bond Spreads in the Data and in the Model (1994.2-2001.4)
The ﬁgure plots the bond spreads and output in the data and in the model when the
output data is fed in the simulation. The solid line is the bond spreads data (3-year
bond spreads). The dashed line is the bond spreads generated by the model. The













Bad State Good State
Figure 8: Bond Price for θ =0 .35
The ﬁgure plots the bond price as a function of assets for the highest and lowest
value of endowment shock when the country’s bargaining power is 0.35. The solid
line corresponds to bond price function with the low endowment shock (bad state),




Construction of Bond Price Correspondence. Given α(b,y) and q(b,y),w eﬁrst deﬁne
M∗ (b0,y)(q) as the set of default probabilities consistent with the sovereign’s default choice
for debt level b0 and type y, given the price schedule q.I f my ∈ M∗ (b0,y)(q) then there is a
d∗ (b0,y0,q) such that
R
Y d∗ (b0,y0,q)dµy (y0)=my.W e t h e n d e ﬁne the equilibrium bond price







{x : x = q[m · α(b0,y)+( 1− m)]} for some m ∈ M∗ (b0,y)(q)
q
if b0 ≥ 0
if b0 ≤ 0
Then, q∗ is an equilibrium price vector if q∗ (b0,y;α) ∈ ϕ(q∗)(b0,y;α) for all b0,y∈ B ×Y ,g i v e n
α ∈ C0.
Lemma 1 Given α,f o re a c hq, ϕ(q)(b0,y;α) i sac l o s e di n t e r v a li nR and the correspondence
ϕ(q)(b0,y;α) h a sac l o s e dg r a p h .
Proof. We can show that ϕ(q)(b0,y;α) is a closed interval in R using a similar proof
for Lemma App 5 in Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2002). We also follow the
proof for Lemma 8 in Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2002) to show that the
correspondence ϕ(q)(b0,y;α) has a closed graph.
P r o o fo fS t e p1i nT h e o r e m1 . Given α,f o re a c hb0,y, ϕ(q)(b0,y;α) is closed-valued
with compact Hausdorﬀ range space, therefore ϕ(q)(b0,y;α) is an upper hemicontinuous corre-
spondence (see Aliprantis and Border (1999) Thm 16.12 pp. 529). For any q ∈ Q,l e tϕ(q) ⊂ Q
be the product correspondence Πb0,y∈B×Y ϕ(q)(b0,y;α).S i n c eϕ(q)(b0,y;α) is convex-valued for
each b0,y, ϕ(q) is convex-valued as well. Furthermore, since ϕ(q)(b0,y;α) is upper hemicontinu-
ous with compact values for each b0,y,the product correspondence ϕ(q) is upper hemicontinuous
with compact values as well. (see Aliprantis and Border (1999), Thm 16.28, pp. 537). Therefore,
ϕ(q;α) is a closed convex-valued correspondence that takes elements of the compact, convex set
Q and returns sets in Q. By Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg FPT (Corollary of Halpern-Bergman FPT,
see Aliprantis and Border (1999), Thm 16.51, pp. 550) there is q∗ ∈ Q such that q∗ ∈ ϕ(q∗).I n
other words, given α, there exists q∗ such that q∗ (b0,y)(α) ∈ ϕ(q∗)(b0,y;α) for all b0,y∈ B×Y .
Hence, given α, a competitive equilibrium exists.
46Construction of Debt Recovery Correspondence. Given q(b,y),w eﬁrst deﬁne the
correspondence for the domain of debt recovery rate in renegotiation ω(α)(b,y;q):A → [0,1]
ω(α)(b,y;q)=
©
a ∈ [0,1] : ∆B (a;b,y,α,q) ≥ 0,∆L (a;b,y,α,q) ≥ 0
ª
We then deﬁne the debt recovery correspondence by







Lemma 2 The correspondence ω(α)(b,y;q) is a continuous correspondence with nonempty
compact value.
Proof. Step 1: We establish that ω(α)(b,y;q) is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence.
First, ω(α)(b,y;q) is closed-valued. If an ∈ ω(α)(b,y;q) and an → a∗,t h e nlimn→∞
∆B (an;b,y,α,q)=∆B (a∗;b,y,α,q) ≥ 0 and limn→∞ ∆L (an;b,y,α,q)=∆B (a∗;b,y,α,q) ≥ 0
because ∆B (a,α)(b,y;q) and ∆L (a,α)(b,y;q) are continuous in a. Second, ω(α)(b,y;q) has
a closed graph. For αn → α,an → a,L e t{(αn,a n)} be any sequence in A × [0,1] such that
an ∈ ω(αn)(b,y;q) and {(αn,a n)} converges to (α,a), α ∈ Q. We need to establish that a ∈
ω(α;q)(b,y). We need to show that ∆B (a;b,y,α,q) ≥ 0,∆L (a;b,y,α,q) ≥ 0.T h i si st r u eb e -
cause ∆B (a;b,y,α,q) and ∆L (a;b,y,α,q) are continuous in a and α, limn→∞ ∆B (an;b,y,αn,q)
= ∆B (a;b,y,α,q) ≥ 0 and limn→∞ ∆L (an;b,y,αn,q)=∆L (a;b,y,α,q) ≥ 0. Last, the corre-
spondence ω(α;q)(b,y) has compact Hausdorﬀ range space. Hence by closed graph theorem (
see Aliprantis and Border (1999), Thm 16.12, pp. 529), ω(α;q)(b,y) is upper hemicontinuous.
Step 2: We establish that ω(α)(b,y;q) is a lower hemicontinuous correspondence. For any
closed subset F of [0,1], we want to show that the upper inverse of F, ωu (F)(b,y) is also closed.
The upper inverse of F is ωu (F)(b,y)={α ∈ A : ω(α)(b,y) ⊂ F}.L e t αn ∈ ωu (F)(b,y)
and αn → α.B e c a u s eω(αn)(b,y) ⊂ F,a n d∆B (:;b,y,αn) and ∆L (:;b,y,αn) are continuous,
ω(αn)(b,y) → ω(α)(b,y).S i n c eF is closed set, ω(α)(b,y) ∈ F. Therefore,
α ∈ ωu (F)(b,y). The upper inverse of any closed set is also closed. Hence ω(α)(b,y;q) is a
lower hemicontinuous correspondence.
Step 3: From step 1 and 2, ω(α;q)(b,y) is a continuous correspondence. Because
ω(α)(b,y;q) is closed valued and bounded, ω(α)(b,y;q) also has compact value.
ω(α)(b,y;q) is nonempty because 0 ∈ ω(α)(b,y;q).
47P r o o fo fS t e p2i nT h e o r e m1 . Given q,f o re a c hb0,y, because [0,1] is Hausdorﬀ and
the correspondence ω(α)(b,y;q) is a continuous correspondence with nonempty compact value,
ψ(α)(b0,y;q) is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with nonempty compact values from
Berge’s Maximum Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999) Thm 16.31 pp. 539). For any α ∈
A,l e tψ (α;a) ⊂ A be the product correspondence Πb0,y∈L×Y ψ(α)(b0,y;q).S i n c eψ(q)(b0,y;α)
is upper hemicontinuous with compact values for each b0,y,the product correspondence ψ(q;α)
is upper hemicontinuous with compact values as well. (see Aliprantis and Border (1999), Thm
16.28, pp. 537). For bargaining power θ ∈ Θ, ψ(α)(b0,y;q) is single-valued, so is the product
correspondence ψ(q;α).T h e r e f o r e ,ψ(q;α) is a closed convex-valued correspondence that takes
elements of the compact, convex set A and returns sets in A. By Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg FPT
(Corollary of Halpern-Bergman FPT, see Aliprantis and Border (1999), Thm 16.51, pp. 550)
there is α∗ ∈ A such that α∗ ∈ ω(α∗;q).I n o t h e r w o r d s , g i v e n q,t h e r ee x i s t sα∗ such that
α∗ (b0,y)(α) ∈ ψ(α∗)(b0,y;q) for all b0,y∈ L × Y .
P r o o fo fS t e p3i nT h e o r e m1 . We construct a functional mapping correspondence






Because ϕ(q)(b0,y;q,α) and ψ(α)(b,y;q,α) are upper hemicontinuous, T (q,α) is upper hemi-
continous. (see Aliprantis and Border (1999) Thm 16.23 pp. 539). Therefore, the correspon-
dence T (q,α) has a closed graph. We can also show that T (q,α) is convex valued. Sup-
pose (q1,α 1) ∈ T (q,α) and (q2,α 2) ∈ T (q,α). Because ϕ(q)(b0,y;q,α) is convex valued,
γq1+(1− γ)q2 ∈ ϕ(q;α). Because ψ(α)(b,y;q,α) is single valued, α1 = α2 = γα1+(1− γ)α2 ∈
ψ(α;q). Therefore, (γq1 +( 1− γ)q2,γα 1 +( 1− γ)α2). Hence, we can apply Kakutani’s ﬁxed
point theorem and show the existence of a ﬁxed point.
T (q∗,α)(b,y)=( q∗,α ∗)
A recursive equilibrium exists.
48P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . Deﬁne the functional mapping M for the sovereign’s value function.
For b ≥ 0, h =0 ,



















For b<0, h =0 ,
M (v)(b,0,y)=m a x
(







For h =1 ,

























It is easy to show that M is a contraction mapping and its ﬁxed point is the sovereign’s value
function v∗. Therefore, to prove the theorem is equivalent to show that M (v) maps an increasing
function to an increasing function.
Assume v(b,h,y) is an increasing function in b. Given state variables (b,h,y),d e n o t et h e
budget set by B (b,h,y,d) for the sovereign which makes its default decision d.L e t b0 ≤


























b1 by assumption on α ∈ A,s oM (v)(b,1,y) increases in b.I f

















. For both cases, M (v)(b,1,y) increases in b.F o r h =1 ,i f0 >b 0 ≥ b1,
then c0 ∈
h









cause (1 − λd)y + b0 > (1 − λd)y + b1 and (1 − λd)y + rl0
1+r > (1 − λd)y + rl1
1+r,i ft h eo p t i m a l
















.I f t h e






,a n db0 ≤ 0.S o ,M (v)(b,1,y) increases in b.
We have shown that M (v)(b,h,y,1) increases in b. Therefore, the ﬁxed point v∗ (b,h,y) of
functional mapping M is also increasing in b.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 . Because ∆B (a;b,y) and ∆L (a;b,y) are both function of al,d e ﬁne









s.t. e ∆B (al;y) ≥ 0
e ∆L (al;y) ≥ 0
where the functional form of e ∆B (al;y) and e ∆L (al;y) a r es i m p l et r a n s f o r m a t i o no f∆B (a;b,y)
and ∆L (a;b,y). For bargaining power θ ∈ Θ,g i v e n(b,y), the renegotiation surplus has a unique
optimum. In the transformed problem, the optimal solution is solely a function of endowment y
a n dw ed e n o t ei ta sby ≤ 0. The bargaining over debt reduction has constraint a ∈ [0,1].W h e n
b ≤ by, the constraint a ∈ [0,1] is not binding, so a =
by
b .I fb ≥ by, the constraint a ∈ [0,1] is




b if b ≤ by
1 if b ≥ by
Because an equilibrium debt recovery rate function is a ﬁxed point of the correspondence
ψ(α;q)(b,y), the debt recovery rate also satisﬁes
α(b,y)=
½by
b if b ≤ by
1 if b ≥ by
Proof of Theorem 4. >From Theorem 2, v(b,0,y) is increasing in b. Since the equi-
librium debt recovery schedule satisﬁes Theorem 3, given endowment y, the debt arrear after










u((1 − λd)y)+βv(by,1,y).H e n c e ,a n yy that belongs in D
¡
b1¢




P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 . Let d∗ (b,0,y0) be the equilibrium default functions. Equilibrium














50>From Theorem 4, if d∗ ¡
b1,0,y0¢
=1 ,t h e nd∗ ¡
b0,0,y0¢


















P r o o fo fT h e o r e m6 . Let p∗ (b,y) be the equilibrium default probability function and








































p(b0,y) · γ (b0,y)
1+r
=
1 − p(b0,y)(1− γ (b0,y))
1+r













u((1 − λd)y + b) − u
¡
(1 − λd)y + b − b0/(1 + r)
¢¤
≥ 0
If b ∈ L−− and b ≥ b, for all b0 < 0,
u((1 − λd)y + b) − u
¡
(1 − λd)y + b − b0/(1 + r)
¢
≥ u((1 − λd)y + b)+u
¡




























































If b ∈ L−− and b ≥ b, for all b0 < 0, suppose


























then, according the above analysis,




























This appendix outlines the procedure to compute the equilibrium of the model economy.
First we set grids on the spaces of asset holdings and endowment. The asset space is dis-
cretized into 600 grids, and we use 51 equally spaced grids to discretize the space for endowment
shocks. The limits of the asset space are set to ensure that the limits do not bind in equi-
librium. The limits of endowment space are large to include big deviations from the average
value of shocks. We approximate the distribution of endowment shock using a discrete Markov
transition matrix. Then, we use the following procedure to compute an equilibrium.
1. Guess an initial debt recovery schedule α0. Our initial guess is 1.
2. Given a debt recovery schedule α0, we solve for equilibrium bond price q0
(a) Guess an initial price of discounted loans q00. Our initial guess is the risk free bond price
1/(1+r∗).
(b) Given a price for loans, q00, we solve the country’s optimization problem. This procedure
includes ﬁnding the value function as well as the default decisions. We ﬁrst guess value function
v0 and iterate it using the Bellman equation to ﬁnd the ﬁxed out v∗, given bond price and debt
52recovery rates. For the problem of a country with debt and a good credit score, we also obtain
the optimal default choice, which requires comparison between the implications of defaulting
and not defaulting. This comparison also enables us to calculate the corresponding default set.
(c) Using the default set derived in step (b) and the zero proﬁt condition for international
investors, we compute the new price of discounted bonds q01.I fq01 is suﬃciently close to q00,
stop iterating on q and go on to the step 3, else go back to step (b).
3. Solve the bargaining problem given converged bond price q∗
0 and compute the new debt
recovery schedule for every (b,y). If the new debt recovery schedule α01 is suﬃciently close to
α00, stop iterating on α, else, go back to step 2.
53